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Abstract
This article deals with the following question: although both Anti-Personnel
Landmines (APLM) and Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) cases were once
considered as dealing with the same ''micro disarmament'- issues, why has the
regime formation process afterwards differed substantially? In order to answer
this question, this paper argues that while the recast of discourse from "necessary
weapons for national security" to ''inhuman weapons" was successful in the case of
APLM, formation of the discourse itself failed in the case of SALW. This resulted
in the politically binding instrument aiming at the control, rather than the total
elimination of SALW.
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regime formation, small arms and light weapons (SALW)
*Ph. D. Candidate, Osaka School of International Public Policy, Osaka University.
1 ) The author is grateful to Prof. Mitsuru Kurosawa and to Associate Prof. Kaoru Kurusu, both at Osaka
University, for their valuable comments and constant encouragement.
This article is the revised version of the paper presented at the 55th Pug-wash Conference on Science and
World Affairs: 60 Years After Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 22-27 July 2005, Hiroshima, Japan.
124
Introduction
国際公共政策研究 第10巻第2号
It was only in the 1990-s that the problems regarding Small Arms and Light
Weapons (SALW) became one of the ''micro disarmament"- issues together with
Anti-Personnel Landmines (APトM) . In response to the urgent needs for
regulation", the Programme of Action on SALW (PoA) was adopted at the UN
Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its
Aspects held in New York on 9-20 July, 2001. Although the adoption of the PoA
was a landmark step for the regulation of SALW, as the UN Secretary General
called it　-essential in building norms,''there remained several limitations as an
international arrangement. First, the goal of the instrument is not the total
elimination but the control of the use, transfer and production of SALW. Second,
it is not a legally binding instrument. In contrast, the Convention on the
Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-personnel
Mines on Their Destruction of APLM (Ottawa treaty) is a legally binding
instrument, aiming at total elimination. Why did the regime formation process
afterwards become substantially different, even though both cases were once
considered as the same ''micro disarmament" issues? To explain this phenomenon,
this article highlights the humanitarian dimension of the regime formation process
of SALW and defines the process as a failed case of recasting discourse of weapons
as humanitarian issue.
While there exist a variety of researches on the regime formation process of
APLM in existing literature4', with a few exceptions, this literature does not yet
exist in the field of SALW. Nonetheless, examination of this process is important
for at least two reasons. First, in contrast to the success of norm building with
~
2) The concept 'micro disarmament'was introduced by the former UN Secretary General, Bourtros
Bourtros-Ghali (UN doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January, 1995: para. 60-64).
3 ) According to the UN report, at least 500,000 people die every year as a result of SALW. (ibid.: para. 63).
4) for example, see, Kenki Adachi, The Ottawa Process; Formation of Anti-Personnel Landmines Ban
Regime. Toyko: Yushindo, 2004 (Japanese); Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W.
Tomhn eds., To Walk without Fear: The Global Movement to Ban Landmines. Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 1998.
5) about the literature on SALW see, Keith Krause, "A Review of Multilateralism and International
Organization,'Global Governance, vol.8 no.2 (2002): 247-263; A Projects of the Graduate Institute of
lnternational Studies ed., Small Arms Survey 2005. New York: Oxford University Press　2005.
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APLM, it may suggest key factors such as the character of weapons, the
recognition of weapons, and the arena for negotiation, which affect the regime
formation process in the fields of conventional weapons. Second, by learning the
lessons of past failures, it may contribute practically to the future regime
formation process of SALW since the process is still ongoing.
Using the UN documentary record and other resources, this essay mainly
investigates the following two questions: first言n the case of SALW, why was the
total ban regime not formulated?; second, why did the change of discourse of
SALW as a humanitarian issue fail? In order to answer these questions, section 1
defines the regime on SALW and examines the major determinants of the regime
formation. Section 2 investigates the regime formation process of SALW to date:
from 1993 to 1996, SALW problems were formally acknowledged in the arena of
the UN; from 1997 to 2000, the outline of the regime had been discussed and
formulated based on the UN reports both in 1997 and 1999 which directed the
regime formation process; and finally in　2001, the internationally agreed
arrangement regarding SALW was adopted at the UN conference, which became
the central framework for the regulation of the weapons. Based on these facts,
section　3　analyzes the regime formation process and considers the two main
questions stated previously.
1. Determinants of Regime Formation
In order to explain the success or failure in efforts of regime formation, three
principal factors - power, interest and knowledge - are focused on". This section
defines the regime on SALW and studies how these three determinants of regime
formation worked for the case of SALW.
Before beginning the main discussions, the regime on SALW must be defined.
6 ) Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer and Volker Rittberger eds.. Theories of International Regimes.
Cambridge: Cambridge Universities Press, 1997; Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, "Testing Theories
of Regime Formation: Findings from a Large Collaborative Research Project," Volker Rittberger eds.
(with the assistance of Peter Mayer), Regime Theory and International Relations. New York: Clarendon
Press, 1993: 228-251.
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According to Krasner's famous formulation, international regimes are defined as
sets of principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures in a certain issue
While it is a controversial question whether the PoA established a firm
normative framework or not , this essay takes such standpoint that the PoA
revealed and confirmed the sets of principles and norms on SALW. For instance,
as further examined in section 2, the PoA prescribed the basic principles for
regulation, such as:
-Small arms and light weapons have been or are the primary or sole
tools of violence in several of the armed conflicts (para. 15).
-States have the right to export and import small arms and light
weapons (para. 45).
-Illicit trafficking in such weapons plays a major role in the violence
(para. 58).9
The PoA, which was adopted by consensus in 2001, has been accepted by a wide
range of actors in the international community. In accordance with the PoA-s
provisions, many states have taken concrete measures to challenge this issue. For
example, in the two years following the adoption of the PoA, 97 UN Member
States designated national points of contact to act as a liaison with other States
in order to meet the requirement of the PoA. As of July 2003, over 90 countries
either have adopted or have domestic laws to govern illicit manufacture, possession
and trade of weaponslO'. As those facts clearly show, there are certain principles
and norms of SALW, which guide the behavior of states and other actors. Given
the existence of a regime in the field of SALW, the next question comes as to howllll ll1-
7 ) More precisely, international regimes are defined as follows:
Regimes can be defined as sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making
procedures around which actor's expectations converge in a given area of international relations
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and, rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms
of rights and obligations.
(Stephen D. Krasner ed., International Regimes. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982: 2)
8 ) in detail, see A Projects of the Graduate Institute of International Studies ed., Small Arms Survey 2003:
Development Denied, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003: chap.7.
9) UN doc. A/52/298, 27 August, 1997
10) UN doc. A/CONF.192/BMS/2003/1, 1 July, 2003: annex, para. ll-12
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this regime was formed.
The power-based hypothesis offers a proposition that the participation of a
single dominant party led to success in regime formation. In the case of SALW,
however, major powers were not active in the process. In fact, they themselves
were major producers of SALW, and hence profited from the trade of SALW. For
example, the world's three major SALW producers are China, the Russian
Federation and the United States. According to data from the Small Arms Survey,
while the total value of the US production in SALW, including ammunition, was
USD 2.5 billion in 2001, the total sales of SALW in Russia was approximately
USD 220 million in 20021U. since SALW are important items for trade as well as
for national armies and police, major powers have had negative attitudes toward
the regulation since the beginning, to say nothing of the total elimination of
SALW. Therefore, the feasibility of regime formation by the superpowers is very
low.
The interest-based hypothesis provides an explanation of regime formation by
the cost-benefit behavior of the states in the context of decision一making. While
some war-affected countries such as African countries wanted to reduce the cost of
the proliferation of SALW, a considerable number of countries received benefits
from the use or trade of SALW. For example, the total elimination of SALW is
obviously contradictory to the interests of SALW producers. In this context,
reaching an agreement among states on the total elimination of SALW is difficult.
The knowledge-based hypothesis gives the proposition that value and scientific
knowledge influence the course of regime formation. If neither determinants of
power nor interest work, the only way to achieve regime formation is to change
the recognition of the object itself. As indicated in the table below, it is often the
case that the principles of humanitarian law, such as the prohibition of
unnecessary suffering or superfluous injury, become the focal point to form a
_
ll) A Projects of the Graduate Institute of International Studies ed., Small Arms Survの2004. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2004: 10-ll.
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Tab一e 1 Major International instrument of conventional weapons
Thenameoftheinstrum'
(Year。fad。pti。n)帥ObjectTypeofregulation慧霊霊汀。
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in
Time of War, of Explosive
Projectiles under　400　Grammes
Weight (St. Petersburg Declaration)
(1869)
Explosive projectiles under　400
grammes weight
unnecessaryProhibitionofuse--.
suffering
呂霊霊霊concerning DamDum bullets Prohibition of -　㌫冨y
Convention on Prohibitions or Reshctions on the use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which superfluous
May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects (CCW Convention) injury
unnecessary
Protocol I Non-detectable Fragments Prohibition of use
Protocol II Landmines and Booby-traps and
(Amended in other devices
Restriction of use
Protocol III Incendiary Weapons Restriction of use
Proto∽l VI
(adopted in
Blinding Lasers Prohibition of use
Protocol V
adopted in 2003
Responsibility for
Explosive Remnants of War clearance of
remnants
suffering
Convention on the Prohibition of
the Use, Stockpiling, Production
and Transfer of Anti-personnel Anti-personnel Mines
Mines on Their Destruction (Ottawa
Treaty) (1997)
Prohibition of use,
Stockpiling,　　　　unnecessary
Production and suffering
Transfer
on Dieter Fleck ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Co獅. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995: 551-5
For example, with Anti-personnel Mines, there was the critical change in the
recognition from legal weapons which are necessary to security assurance" to
"inhuman weapons which must be prohibited." This transformation of discourse led
to the Ottawa Treaty being realized, which was adopted in 1997. However, in the
case of SALW, the recognition that these weapons are inhumane, and thus must
be prohibited, has not yet been seen in the process of regime formation. The next
section will examine the process more in detail, focusing on the recognition of
SALW.
12) About International Humanitarian law, see Dieter Fleck ed., The Handbook of Humanitarian Law
Armed Conflicts. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
13) Kenki Adachi, op. cit; Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin eds., op. cit.
Analysis on Regime Formation of SALW
2. The Process of Regime Formation
From 1993 to 1996, upon the request of a country suffering from the abuse of
SALW, the UN put this issue on the international agenda. From 1997 to 2000, the
first comprehensive UN report on this issue was submitted to the UN General
Assembly, which determined the direction of the regime on SALW. Finally, in
2001, the PoA was adopted at the UN conference, which became the central
framework of the SALW regime. During this process, how was the momentum
towards the regulation of SALW built up? In what way has the norms of SALW
been established? Why was the total ban arrangement not formulated?
(1) 1993-1996
During this period, the "emergence of norms"1*, these arms became an
international issue. This part briefly examines the emergence of SALW issues,
focusing on the actions of states, the UN and NGOs.
At the beginning, the process of the SALW issue started from a request from
the Republic of Mali for international support. Although a year had passed after
the peaceful resolution of their internal conflict was concluded in 1992, Mali still
suffered from a precarious internal security situation because of the proliferation
of SALW. Upon the request from the then president of Mali to the UN Secretary
General for support of the collection and destruction of SALW, the resolution
entitled "Assistance to States for curbing the illicit traffic in small arms and
collecting them'- was adopted at the UN GA in December 199415).
In response to the request for help from the affected country, the UN started to
commit itself to this issue and the problems with SALW became one of the main
agendas in the UN arena. The Secretary General emphasized the importance of
this problem in his report "Supplement to An Agenda for Peace'- introduced in
14) According to the "life-cycle model," norms evolve in three stages: "emergence," "norm cascade," and
internalization." (Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, "International Norm Dynamics and Political
Change," International Organization vol.52 no.4 (1998): 897-917).
15) UN doc. A/49/75G, 15 December, 1994.
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October 1995 . Upon the request of the UN resolution entitled "small arms" the
UN decided to establish the Panel of Governmental Experts on Small Arms in
order to prepare a report on SALWl'!
The NGOs also took part in this issue, however, international campaigns were
not yet developed at this stage. For example, upon the request by the
International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent in December 1995, the
International Committee of Red Cross (ICRC) started to examine, on the basis of
its first-hand information and the ICRC medical database, the impact of
availability of SALW on the situations of civilians. As shown in the next part,
this 1999 report had a profound impact on the regime formation process of SALW.
(2) 1997-2000
The year 1997 became one of the landmark years for the SALW regime building
process since at this stage, several key factors came to become clear: the definition
of SALW was clarified; inherent inhuman nature of SALW was denied; concrete
measures to combat SALW problems were presented in the UN report (hereinafter
t'1997 report"). Furthermore, during this period, the international movements of
NGOs became active. In 1998 the International Action Network on Small Arms
(IANSA), was founded, which played a role in advocacy in the UN process."
In August 1997　the Panel of Governmental Experts submitted the first
comprehensive report of SALW at the 52nd General Assembly. The report was
prepared between 24 June and 18 July with three sessions in New York and one
meeting in Tokyo . In the case of SALW, this UN process became the mainstream
for the regime formation and, in fact, led the agreed framework to be adopted in
2001. In other words, the regime formation process of SALW has been mainly
16) UN doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, 3 January, 1995, para. 63
17) UN doc. A/50/7GB, 12 December, 1995
18) International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) is the global network of NGOs working to stop
the proliferation and misuse of SALW. For more detail, see the website of IANSA retrieved in October,
2005. (http//www.isansa.org)
19) UN doc. A/52/298, 27 August, 1997.
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handled by states in the UN arena2'
The outcome of the 1997 report was that, first, it defined the category of the
weapons. Due to a lack of disarmament and arms control agreement on SALW,
the definition of SALW category was not clear until this report defined it.
According to the report, small arms are those weapons designed for personal use
and light weapons are those designed for.use by several persons serving as a
crew .
Second, the report denied the inherent inhuman character of the weapons
themselves and acknowledged that:
m contrast to anti-personnel landmines, small arms are constructed for and
capable of precise direct fire without inherent indiscriminate effects.2
From this time on, the proper control of SALW became the main focus and the
discussion on the total ban of these weapons themselves has been excluded from
the mainstream of the discussion. As a result, there appear two categories of
SALW: the "legitimate" SALW which are owned by states or are authorized by
states; and illegitimate'- SALW which are owned by non-state actors without any
authorization by states and which are the objectives of international regulation. In
1999, the ICRC research also endorsed these facts and concluded that the
availability of weapons alone is not the cause of violations of humanitarian law or
deterioration in the situation of civilians23'. But why did humanitarian dimension
of SALW become excluded from the regime formation process? The president of
the Panel of Governmental Experts on SALW explained this question as follows-.・.・.・.・.I---.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・・.-.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.-.・.・.・.・.・.・・.I-.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.-.+
20) In contrast, in the case of APLM, after the insufficient achievement of the review Conference 。f the
CCW Convention in 1996, the main negotiation on the total ban of the weapons was carried out by the
like一minded nations (so-called Ottawa process), outside the Conference on Disarmament. For further
information on the Ottawa process, see Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomlin
eds., op.cit..
21) UN doc. A/52/298, 27 August, 1997: para. 25.
22) ibid∴ para. 32. (underlined by the author)
23) the International Committee of Red Cross, "Arms Availability and the Situation of Civilians in Armed
Conflict; Study Presented by ICRC." ICRC publication ref. 0734 (1999): para. 1, part 6.
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At this stage in 1997 or 1998, we tried to avoid further discussions about
huねanitarian dimension of SALW because such arguments would beg the
point in dispute2'
Third, on the basis of these facts and objects, the 1997 report provided a detailed
set of practical recommendations to tackle the problems with SALW, comprised of
(l)measures to reduce the excessive and destabilizing accumulation and transfer of
SALW and (2)measures to prevent such accumulations and transfers from
occurring in the future . Reduction measures included: the establishment of a
disarmament component in PKO (para. 79d of the 1997 report); the development of
international cooperation among police, custom and border control officials of
J
states and regional organizations (79e). Prevention measures included: introduction
of guidelines by all states for international arms transfers (80a); the establishment
in all states of adequate laws and regulations to control over the legal possession
and transfer of SALW (80c). These measures were further developed in the 1999
report ,presented by the Group of Governmental Experts on SALW, the successor
of the Panel.
While the regime formation process had been mainly handled by UN-appointed
experts, the movement of NGOs also became active. In 1997, a group of Nobel
Peace Laureates began a campaign for a more responsible arms control treaty.
Based on the principles laid out by the Laureates, a coalition of NGOs including
Amnesty International, Oxfam and the members of IANSA drafted an
International Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). However, as further discussed in section
3, the participation of NGOs was limited compared with the case of APLM.
Moreover, unlike the Ottawa process of APLM, their activities were mainly carried
24) Interview with Mr. Mitsuro Donowaki on 19 November, 2003, Osaka, Japan. He served as the president
of both the 1997 Panel of Governmental Experts and the 1999 Group of Governmental Experts of SALW.
25) UN doc. A/52/298, 27 August, 1997: para. 78.
26) UN doc. A/54/258, 19 August, 1999.
27) About ATT, see the website of NGO retrieved in October, 2005.
(http : //italy. p eacelink. org/paxchristi/articles/art_1884. html)
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out within the UN process21
(3) 2001-present
Based on the provisions of the 1997 report, which recommended "convenin豆an
international conference on the illicit arms trade in all its aspect29'," the Conference
on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects was held
in New York on 9-20 July, 2001. At the conference, the PoA was adopted by
consensus on　20 July　2001, presenting states, regional organizations and
international organizations with practical steps for overcoming SALW problems.
The PoA consists of four parts: I. Preamble; II. Actions to be taken for
preventing, combating and eradicating the illicit trade in SALW in all its aspects;
III. Implementation, international cooperation and assistance; VI. Follow-up to the
Conference. While it is not a legally binding instrument, the PoA established a
firm normative and comprehensive framework to guide states or
intergovernmental organizations. For example, at the national level, states must
take the following actions shown in the table below.
Table 2 Major actions to be taken by states in PoA
National actions
-Establishment of laws and regulations for controlling the
production, export, import, transit or transfer of SALW
-Establishment and maintenance of effective national system
of export and import(IL, - Controlling the broker
-Ensuring the control on state-owned SALW
Transnational actions　　　　-Establishment of tracing system
-Promotion of International assistance including technical and
financial assistance
International cooperation　-Assistance for states in building capacities of law
and assistance enforcement and tracing
-Assistance for destruction of surplus weapons
-Assistance for DDR
Based on UN doc. A/CONF.192/15, 21 July, 2005: 10-16.
28) According to the web site of IANSA, one of their aims is that they will "continue to play a leadership
role in the UN Small Arms Conference process." (http//www.isansa.org) (retrieved in October, 2005)
29) UN doc. A/52/298, 27 August, 1997: para. 80(k).
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During the conference, major powers stressed and focused primarily on their
own interests and hardly at all on that of the international community. For
example, the United Sates mainly opposed to two points: the limitation of state
supply of SALW only to governments in recipient countries; and the prohibition of
the unrestricted trade in and private ownership of SALW . Another example of
this was the delegation of the Russian Federation, who emphasized the legitimate
needs of arms-receiving countries for their self-defense and national security3
3. Analysis on the Regime formation of SALW
Based on the facts provided in the previous section, this part makes an analysis
of the regime formation process by contrasting the following three major
differences of the regime of SALW with that of APLM: first, that the PoA has
not led to a legally binding instrument; second, that the goal of the arrangement
is not the total ban; and third, the change of discourse has failed in its formation
process.
As described before, what differentiates the regime of SALW from that of
APLM is that while the Ottawa treaty is a legally binding instrument, the PoA
itself merely remains a politically binding instrument. At the regional level,
however, there are some legally binding instruments as shown on table 3 below.
These sub-regimes also constitute and reinforce the SALW regime.
30) Pieter D. Wezeman, "The UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons, SIPRI
ed., SIPRI Yearbook 2002. New York: Oxford University Press: 736-739.
31) UN doc. DC/2787 (Press Release), 10 July, 2001.
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Table 3 Major regional/sub-regimes on SALW
Region(Organization)N-eoftheinstrumentDateofadoptionCharacterofthe
document
A fricこl
(Southern
Development
SADC)
c.m豊㌫豊10
R :呂Ee怨霊f慧earms,Ammuni
theS。uthern霊宝A鵬2001Developm ntCommunityRegion
America
(Organization of American Inter-American Convention against the　聖N。vember, 1997States: OAS)　　　　　Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms in
Ammunition, Explosives and Other Related Materials
塾墾
田uropean Union: EU)  (1) European Union Joint Action adopted by the Council
on the basis of Article J3 of the Treaty on European
Union on the European Union's contribution to
combating the destabilizing accumulation and spread
of small arms and light weapons
(Orgam組tion for Security (2)Organi姐tion for Security and Co-0即ration in
and C0-Operation Europe (OSCE) Document on Small Arms and Light
Europe: OSCE)　　　　　Weapons
(DDecember, 1998 (l)L gal
(2)N vember, 2000ゥPolitical
Asia pacific
(Pacific Island Forum: PIF) Legal Framework for a Common Approach to Weapons March,
Control
Other multilateral forum
Wassenaar Arrangement The Wassenaar Arrangement Best Practice Guidelines December, 2002　Political
for Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons
Based on the Small Arms Survey's date which can be retrieved from URL: http://www.smallarmssurvey.org (as of 1
June,
The second major difference, whether a regime aims at the total ban or not,
links directly to the question: why, in the case of SALW, was the total ban regime
not formulated? The argument of this paper is that neither of the three prime
determinants - power, interest and knowledge - was not strong enough to form
the total ban regime. In terms of determinants of power and interest, most of the
states including major powers, have found no reason to make a total ban regime
since SALW are necessary weapons for all nations regarding national and internal
security. Moreover, they are important trade goods for many countries.32'Given
these situations, it is a logical consequence that states do not want to form a total
ban regime for the sake of their own interests, to say nothing of the superpowers.1111111111111111111I--I-LIP
32) the economic impact of the regulation of SALW would be much more crucial for the producers including
major powers than that of APLM, considering the fact that the scale of the market of SALW is bigger
than that of APLM. About the SALW industry, see A Projects of the Graduate Institute of
International Studies ed., op. cit., 2005: chap.2.
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Meanwhile, when neither determinant of power nor interest works, the only way
to achieve regime formation is to change the definition of the subject. For
instance, in the case of APLM, the efforts of the international community, with
strong support from NGO campaigns, removed the weapons from the exclusive
grip of a national security discourse and recast the discourse of weapons as a
humanitarian issue的　As a result, in 1997　the Ottawa treaty of APLM was
adopted. On the contrary, in the case of SALW, such recognition change has not
been seen. In fact, the direct link between SALW and human casualties has not yet
been proved by NGOs and has not been acknowledged by the UN either . This
fact poses the following question.
Finally, with regard to the third major difference of the discourse situations,
why, in the case of SALW, did the change of discourse of the weapons as a
humanitarian issue fail? The following three points must be taken into
consideration. First; unlike APLM, SALW are widely used by not only military
but also police forces. While APLM are generally used for military purposes,
SALW have legitimate uses for both military and police utilities. And besides, they
may be held, like in the U.S., by individuals for their own personal security. Given
that denying the role of SALW held by police forces is rather unrealistic and even
impractical, at least the legitimate uses of these weapons should be recognized.班
so, as discussed in section 2, defining all SALW as ''inhuman weapons'would be
quite difficult when there exist legitimate uses of these weapons on the one hand,
and illegitimate uses on the other. Second, the regime formation has been mainly
handled within the UN process. As is often the case of arms control negotiations,
states tend to focus on their own interests and therefore, try to discuss the matter
piecemeal at conventional forums such as the Conference on Disarmament or UN
arena. For example, in relation to the negotiations of APLM at Conference on
Disarmament, the main forum for negotiations before the Ottawa process, Jozef
Goldblat states that:
33) Maxwell A. Cameron, Robert J. Lawson, and Brian W. Tomhn eds., op. at.
34) the International Committee of Red Cross, op. at.; UN doc. A/52/ 8, 27 August, 1997: para. 25.
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Conference on Disarmament, where - as experience had shown - negotiations
on any subject can go on for years, and where, because of the requirement of
consensus, any participant can block progress.31
Therefore, as the negotiations on APLM at CD have demonstrated, change of
discourse from "necessary weapons for security" to "inhuman weapons" is difficult
when the negotiations are conducted at a conventional arena, and especially when
major states want to retain the former discourse. Third, the scale of NGOs'
participation m the process was limited in the case of SALW. As is often the case
of regime formation, NGOs play active roles in agenda-setting. For example, in
the case of APLM, it is widely acknowledged that the NGOs'campaign was the
catalyst for identifying and politicizing the situation as a humanitarian issue36'. In
a situation m which the establishment of discourse of the weapons as a
humanitarian issue contradicts the interest of major powers, it is the NGOs or
other non-state actors who act in accordance with their own goals, rather than
(and sometimes even against) the state interest. Thereby, NGOs can generate
impetus for recasting discourse of weapons as a humanitarian issue. In the case of
SALW, however, the NGO participation was relatively limited. According to the
estimates of 'Civil society Participation in Multilateral Arms Control Processes-
indicated by Patrick MacCarthy, the participation of NGOs in the process of the
PoA on SALW was about 50 percent, which is substantially lower than that of the
APLM ban Convention case that enjoyed 90 percent participation3'
In summary, because formation of a strict regime for SALW at the beginning
was prevented due to the strong self-interest and economic reasons by major
powers and other states respectively, recognition change to 'inhuman weapons'sawI.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.・.lt
35) Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control: the New Guide to Negotiations and Agreements (second edition). London,
Thousand Oaks, and New Dehli: SAGE publications, 2002: 236.
36) about NGOs role in the regime formation process of APLM see, Kenneth R. Rutherford, ,"The Evolving
Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in Banning Antipersonnel Landmines," World
Politics 53 (October 2000): 74-114; Richard Price, "Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society
Targets Land Mines," International Organization Vol. 52, No.3 (Summer 1998): 613-644.
37) Patrick MacCarthy, "Towards a New Diplomacy? - Government-Civil Society Partnerships Promoting
the Implementation of the UN Programme of Action on Small Arms二(草eynote speech)," The Report "A
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no success. This resulted in the politically binding instrument of SALW which
aims at the control, rather than the elimination of the weapons.
Conelusion
In conclusion, this section attempts to answer the questions raised in the
introduction and draws some comments on regime formation of SALW.
First, this paper argues that because SALW are important weapons for national
security and trade goods, and the discourse change of weapons as a humanitarian
issue failed, a total ban regime has not yet been formed. As a result, the regime
of SALW became a politically binding instrument aiming mainly at controlling the
illicit trade. Second, recast of the discourse of SALW as 'inhuman weaponsつailed,
because of the broad utilities of the weapons, the self-serving state interests in the
UN-led regime formation process, and the limited NGOs participation.
What is to be concluded from those facts is as follows: first, in the situation
where neither determinant of power nor interest work, the third determinant of
knowledge comes to play as a key role for regime formation. Second, in such
circumstances conventional negotiation forum will not work to change the
situations. Thereby, unconventional ways such as negotiations outside the UN
forum or negotiations guided by like-mined states with strong ties with NGOs一
movement will be strategically required in order to lead the discourse to change.
The situation appears difficult, however, the bright side of the story is that
regime formation has only just started. In the case of APLM, while the Ottawa
process was carried out in a record time of less than a year, the regime formation
process of APLM itself dates back to the CCW Convention which was adopted in
1980. Considering the fact that it took more than　30　years for the total ban
regime to be formed, it is not surprising that at this stage the international
framework for SALW remains politically binding. After all, the regime formation
process of SALW has only begun.
